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Abstract  
We conceptualize and propose a theoretical model of sellers’ trust in buyers in the cross border e-
commerce context.  This model is based on by signalling theory, which is further refined by using trust 
theories and empirical findings from prior e-commerce trust research. 
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Introduction 
Global online trade is expected to reach $1.4 trillion by 2015 (Enright 2011). Such a huge electronic 
market exposes both challenges and opportunities for many businesses, particularly those small-and-
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). These SMEs attempt to avoid fierce competition from local players and 
are actively looking for limitless business opportunities beyond the local markets through cross-border 
online business. A recent report estimates that there will be more than 130 million cross-border shoppers 
spending over $300 billion across the world by 2018 (Anderson 2014). Being compared to the domestic e-
commerce, cross-border e-commerce brings lots of business opportunities (e.g. expanding the customer 
base), especially in the emerging markets. Yet, this international electronic market is far more 
complicated and risky than both traditional market and domestic electronic market. In cross-border e-
commerce, SMEs mainly depend on third-party trading platforms, e.g. eBay or DHgate, and share little 
information with buyers. The complex, uncertain and risky nature of this market leads to the importance 
of trust. 
Buyers’ trust has been identified as a key factor in the electronic commerce (Gefen et al. 2003; McKnight 
et al. 2002; Pavlou and Dimoka 2006). What is worth mentioning here is that while establishing buyers’ 
trust-in-sellers is the rather important issue for e-commerce success, accomplished online transactions 
also depend on a seller’s trust-in-potential buyers. Indeed, together with the rapid growth of credit card 
use in e-commerce environment, sellers experience the chargeback risk more frequently. Basically, the 
chargeback mechanism is created primarily for the online environment to help protect buyers. For 
instance, buyers can claim a full refund of the money if they are not satisfied with the products or services 
a seller has offered. Another common reason for filing a chargeback is an unauthorized transaction since a 
credit card is used without the consent or proper authorization of the card holder (i.e. identify theft). The 
 Short Title up to 8 words 
  
 Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 2 
chargeback mechanism has played a very active role of stimulating the propensity of conducting trades 
among SMEs in e-commerce.  
However, sellers are left with limited or no industry support. Chargeback fraud, also known as friendly 
fraud, has been widespread in online trading. When a chargeback occurs, sellers will not only lose the 
products or services they have offered and but also are subjected to chargeback fees. LexisNexis (2013) 
reported that merchants have to afford $1 lost for each $2.79 sale due to fraudulent transactions. Unlike 
face-to-face transaction where both the cardholder and card are present and it is the credit card issuing 
institutions who take sole responsibility in cases of chargebacks, sellers are solely responsible in the 
online business context. Worse still, some buyers even give malicious negative comments1. For each 
transaction, most third-party platforms (e.g. eBay) build a feedback mechanism allowing buyers and 
sellers can choose to rate each other by leaving feedback. Malicious negative feedback appearing on a 
seller’s accounts will significantly prevent potential buyers building trust in the seller. Eventually, an 
excessive number of chargebacks and/or malicious negative comments can lead to the termination of 
sellers’ merchant or platform accounts. Given the chargeback and third-party feedback mechanisms and 
strong customer protection policies, we believe that sellers’ trust-in-buyers may provide sellers with high 
expectation for a successful trading relationship. This is an important issue that has been largely ignored 
or under-developed in the IS literature. Specifically, we ask the research question: What are the 
antecedents of sellers’ trust-in-buyers in cross border e-commerce? Finally, we examine the impact of 
sellers’ trust-in-buyer on sellers’ making decisions on trading. 
The next section reviews theoretical bases and build a conceptual model of sellers’ trust-in-buyer in cross-
border e-commerce. The third section describes the research methodology. The final section mentions 
expected contribution. 
Literature Review 
Trust in E-commerce 
Trust has been studied and defined in the literature in different ways: (1) a set of specific beliefs e.g. the 
integrity, benevolence, and ability of another party (e.g. Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994; ); (2) 
trust intention (McKnight et al. 1998) or the willingness of a party to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another (e.g. Mayer et al 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998); 
(3) affect reflected in the feelings of confidence and security in the caring response of the other (Rempel et 
al. 1985); or (4) a combination of these elements (for a review, see e.g. Gefen et al. 2003).  From a seller’s 
perspective, we adapt Gefen et al.’s (2003) and define sellers’ trust-in buyer as an implicit set of beliefs 
that the buyer won’t act opportunistically and won’t take chargeback fraud behavior. Disposition to trust 
and institution-based trust are two major antecedents of trusting beliefs (McKnight et al, 2002). 
McKnights et al.’s (2002) web trust proposed that “trusting beliefs in e-commerce lead to trusting 
intentions, which in turn result in trust-related behaviors” (p.336). Note that McKnight et al. (2002) 
does not consider the influence of familiarity on trust-related behavioral intention, which has been found 
relatively significant in some studies (e.g. Gefen 2000). Alternatively, McKnight and Chervany (1996) 
proposed three major categories of trust including interpersonal (personal) trust, institution-based 
(impersonal) trust and dispositional trust. Familiarity is a sufficient condition for interpersonal trust. For 
instance, Kim and Kim (2005) indicated that consumers are reluctant to carry out transaction behavior 
with unfamiliar people because of perceived potential risks, such as fraudulent charges. 
Signaling Theory 
Information signaling theory originated from information economics research. This theory acknowledges 
that buyers and sellers possess asymmetrical information when facing a transaction (Spence 1973 and 
1974). For example, buyers are not fully informed about the quality of sellers’ goods or services, whereas 
sellers may not know the financial situation of a buyer. Spence (1974) proposed two kinds of information 
available for market activities indices and signals. The former refers to personal attributes that are 
                                                             
1 See e.g. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7689553.stm, or http://www.hihuadu.com/2015/02/02/secret-taobao-delete-bad-
comments-chain-change-an-appraisal-fee-260-yuan-10949.html 
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immutable fixed (e.g. age, race and sex) while the later are those personal attributes that are generally 
thought to be alterable. For instance, an individual can change his/her education background if he/she 
would like to invest in at some cost in terms of time and money. Such personal attributes of an individual 
(e.g. indices and signals) collectively constitute his/her image perceived by others. In the cross-border e-
commerce context, sellers need to acquire a buyer’s information provided by third-party platforms to 
establish their trust’s in the buyer. In this research, indices are buyers’ attributes that are inherently fixed 
(e.g. buyers’ country of residence) and signals are characteristics that buyer can potentially change at 
some costs (e.g. becoming VIP buyer in DHgate). Collectively, indices and signals can influence sellers’ 
trust in buyers. According to information signaling theory, these buyer attributes should influence trust 
only if they are costly to change (e.g. indices) or acquire (e.g. signals). 
Seller’s Trust-in-Buyer: A Conceptual Model 
In the global e-commerce context, we have developed a conceptual model based on trust theory and 
signaling theory. Hypotheses are listed in Appendix A 
Perceived National Integrity 
Buyers’ country-of-residence is the most important information released by third-party e-commerce 
platforms. Based on the information, two buyers’ attributes that meet the definition of indices are the 
levels of national integrity and legal structure in a buyer’s country-of-residence. These indices should 
influence sellers’ perceptions of the norms, culture or institutional structures in the buyer’s country-of-
residence, which in turn affects sellers’ trust in the buyer. For instance, Doney et al. (1998) proposed that 
social norms often prevent individuals from participating in deviant behaviors. Thus, given that a seller 
perceives that people from a buyer’s country-of-residence collectively follow positive behaviors such as 
honesty, he/she would like to expect the buyer to behave likewise, thereby establishing higher trust.  
Integrity is frequently identified as an important component of trust regardless of whether it is used as an 
antecedent variable (e.g. Mayer et al. 1995) or a trust belief illustrated by McKnight et al.(2002)’s web 
trust model. In this research, we use the construct perceived national integrity to capture buyers’ country-
of-residence attributes influencing a seller’s institution-based trust formation. The term “national 
integrity” in this research refers to a broader national level illustrating the extent to which people in a 
specific country are usually considered to behave in good moral or to adhere to social norms. We propose 
that the higher the national integrity of a country is, the greater the deterrence of deviant behaviors by the 
buyer would be expected. In a country with low level of national integrity, deviant behaviors could be 
more tolerated and not seriously regarded as strange or unacceptable. To some extent, individuals’ 
integrity may be significantly influenced by the level of national integrity.  Thus, this leads to H1. 
Disposition to trust 
Disposition to trust refers to a person’s tendency to be willing to depend on others in different contexts 
(McKnight et al. 1998; Kim and Kim 2005; Gefen 2000). Some people by nature have just a higher 
inclination that people are in general trustworthy and behavior conform to social norms. Some prior 
studies also refer to disposition to trust as propensity to trust (e.g. Mayer et al. 1995). We thus propose 
H2.  
Being compared to disposition to trust, institution-based trust means the degree to which one person 
believes that structural conditions are good enough to support his or her success (McKnight et al. 1998). 
In the cross-border e-commerce context, due to direct competition among numerous sellers, most sellers 
have to keep on attracting new buyers to survive. Building institution-based trust may help facilitate 
transactions between sellers with their new customers to take place. . For that, in this research, two 
constructs are developed for capturing the impact of institution-based trust on sellers’ trust beliefs: credit 
card payment guarantee and seller-driven certification. 
Credit Card Payment Guarantees 
Some third-party platforms (e.g. eBay) provide the seller’s protection mechanism safeguarding merchants 
against losing money to chargebacks and reversals so that fraudulent or unlawful buyer behavior will be 
 Short Title up to 8 words 
  
 Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 4 
mitigated. Prior studies (e.g. Chellappa and Pavlou 2002) propose that buyers could increase their trust in 
sellers as the existence of third-party protection from opportunistic behavior. We believe such a rule may 
also be applied to our research setting: Sellers should increase their trust in buyers by following third-
party seller protection policies. As a result, this leads to H3. 
 
Seller-Driven Certification 
Effective feedback mechanisms can help buyers establish trust in specific sellers (Ba and Pavlou 2002; 
Houser and Wooders 2006; Lee et al. 2000). Pavlou and Gefen (2004) introduced the notion of buyer-
driven certification referring to the extent to which buyers perceive that a feedback system is able to 
provide accurate and reliable information about a seller’s past trading activity. In fact, most third-party 
online transaction platforms such as DHgate or eBay adopts a mutual feedback mechanism so that sellers 
may leave opinions about their transactions with buyers as well. Following Ba and Pavlou (2002), we 
argue that such certification systems can accumulate and disseminate cues about buyers’ past 
performance that may provide sellers with a basis to build trust in buyers. They can be collectively viewed 
as a surrogate for the reputation of buyers in the marketplace to help build sellers’ trust. Buyers’ 
reputation and comments represented by sellers may be viewed as effective indices.  This leads to H4. 
 
Past transaction  
A buyer’s trust in a supplier can be gradually established thanks to the accumulation of information about 
the supplier (Zucker 1986; Gefen 2000). Such accumulation of information is mainly developed by 
repeated interactions (i.e. direct transactions) between trading parties. In other words, the number of 
successful transactions between a buyer and a seller represents the degree of familiarity identified as an 
important antecedent of trust (Gefen 2000).  
Unlike credit card payment, payment gateways such as Western Union and bitcoin do not come with 
chargeback mechanism. These successful transactions together with zero chargeback payment methods 
are effective signals that a buyer can obtain to better communicate his or her honesty or integrity to the 
seller. It is noted that a transaction through credit card payment cannot be considered a successful 
transaction within six months from the date of purchase because sellers are still subjective to chargeback 
risks. Thus, this leads to H5a. 
Being compared to perceived national integrity which is almost unalterable, the individual’s integrity may 
be adjusted based on the quality of trading. Specifically, the successful number of transactions between a 
buyer and a supplier is the direct and most effective cue representing the buyer’s integrity and honesty. 
Therefore, we expect a seller will adjust his/her assessment of the buyer’s trustworthiness as the 
successful number of transactions increases. As the successful number of transactions between trading 
parties increases, perceptions of national integrity should have less influence on the seller’s trust.  Thus, 
this leads to H5b. 
Consequences of Seller’s Trust 
Prior studies proposed that trust beliefs could lend to trust-related intentions (McKnight et al. 2002; 
Gefen & Straub 2004). Adapting McKnight et al. (2002) definition of trusting intentions to our context, 
we define trusting intentions as a seller’s intention to sell products to the buyer who has made an offer for 
the product.  We expect a seller’s buyer-selection decision to be related to his/her trust in a buyer. The 
seller’s trust in a buyer provides self-assurance that the buyer could not participate in fraudulent behavior 
after receiving products or services. Thus, a seller is more likely to receive a buyer’s offer (i.e. payment) in 
whom he or she has more trust.  This leads to H6. 
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Figure 1: Seller’s trust-in-buyer in cross border e-commerce 
Research Methodology 
In this research, we do not consider third-party platforms (e.g. Alibaba.com) that only support online 
buyer-seller information exchange and have not integrated with transaction mechanisms.  Our proposed 
hypotheses will be tested with sellers (or suppliers) at DHgate online marketplace. DHgate.com is the 
biggest e-commerce website connecting mainland China-based SMEs with overseas buyers, where people 
can order Chinese manufactured products directly through the site. There are many online and offline 
payment methods available on DHgate.com such as Credit Card, and Western Union. Measurement items 
are adapted from prior studies. The preliminary instrument was pilot tested in several universities in 
China, UK and USA for clearness. The items were then modified on the basis of a major pre-test of the 
survey instrument with a sample of 60 sellers through the same Website-based data collection method as 
would be applied in the actual data collection. All items are seven-point Likert-type scales (see Appendix 
B). 
Conclusion 
Our study is arguably one of the first attempts to develop a theoretical model of sellers’ trust in cross-
border e-commerce. Theoretically, this study may contribute to the IS literature of online trust. By 
examining a seller’s selling behavioral intention, we may extend general trust research to a relatively new 
research context. We expect to provide a complementary perspective to current trust theoretical models 
for a better understanding of sellers’ selling behavior. Practically, this study may help third-party 
platforms understand what induces sellers to receive online payment and sell products to buyers and gain 
important insights into how to develop an effective online transaction mechanism. 
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